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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCHWARZER, District Judge: 
 
We must decide whether plaintiff is entitled to go to trial 
on his substantive due process claim on evidence that the 
defendant police officers conducted a high-speed chase of a 
suspect in violation of regulations, ending when their 
vehicle rammed the pursued vehicle causing a multi-car 
collision which severely injured plaintiff, a pedestrian 
bystander. We hold that County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 
118 S.Ct. 1708 (1998), is dispositive and that, in the 
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absence of evidence from which a jury could infer a 
purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of 
the chase, the evidence does not satisfy the requisite 
element of arbitrary conduct shocking the conscience. 
Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment for 
defendants. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On the night of November 13, 1994, Dwayne Cook was 
driving a stolen Acura in a residential neighborhood in 
Newark, New Jersey. Police officers in two patrol cars 
observed the Acura stopped in a traffic lane at a stop sign 
for what the officers considered an unusually long time. 
Noting also damage to the car's rear end, the officers 
decided to investigate and one of the patrol cars moved 
alongside the Acura to pull it over while the officers had the 
vehicle plate checked. At this point the Acura pulled away, 
making a left-hand turn out of the intersection. One of the 
police cars pulled ahead, coming close to hitting the Acura. 
The Acura then sped away with the marked police cars in 
pursuit as close as one car length at speeds up to seventy 
miles an hour with their overhead lights on but without 
sirens activated. Cook, knowing he was driving a stolen car, 
did not stop until one of the police cars, as Cook described 
it, bumped into the rear of the Acura, giving it a hard push. 
This caused Cook to hit his head on the steering wheel and 
to pass out. The Acura spun out of control and collided 
with two other cars, one of which was propelled into 
plaintiff, who was standing on the sidewalk, severely 
injuring him. 
 
Plaintiff filed this action in the District Court against the 
Township of Hillside, individual Hillside police officers, and 
owners of the other cars involved in the collision alleging 
violations of federal and state law. The District Court 
granted summary judgment for defendants on all of the 
federal claims and dismissed the state law claims without 
prejudice under 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c) (1994). Plaintiff appeals 
the judgment for the individual officers on his 42 U.S.C. 
SS 19831 and 1985 (1994) claims and the dismissal of his 
state law claims. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court interpreted plaintiff 'sS 1983 claim as a 
substantive 
due process claim. On appeal, plaintiff properly does not take issue with 
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DISCUSSION 
 
I. 42 U.S.C. S 1983 SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS CLAIM 
 
Plaintiff contends that the facts of this case make it 
distinguishable from Sacramento County v. Lewis and 
therefore preclude summary judgment. Our review is 
plenary, see Ingram v. County of Bucks, 114 F.3d 265, 267 
(3d Cir. 1998); we view disputed facts in the light most 
favorable to plaintiff, and we draw all reasonable inferences 
in his favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 
242, 247 (1986); Getahun v. Office of the Chief 
Administrative Hearing Officer of the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review of the United States Department of 
Justice, 124 F.3d 591, 594 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
Plaintiff's attempted distinction of Lewis rests on three 
premises: (1) that the officers were not acting on a report of 
the commission of a crime; (2) that they willfully violated 
applicable police department regulations; and (3) that they 
used deadly force on the pursued vehicle. We consider 
these purported distinctions seriatim.2  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
that interpretation. Even if the use of a police car to stop Cook's flight 
could be found to be a Fourth Amendment seizure, see Brower v. County 
of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989); Adams v. St. Lucie County Sheriff's 
Dep't, 962 F.2d 1563, 1571 (11th Cir. 1992), the claim would be 
personal to Cook and could not be asserted by a bystander such as 
plaintiff. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978). Substantive 
due process analysis is therefore appropriate in this case because 
plaintiff 's claim is not covered by the Fourth Amendment. Lewis, 118 
S.Ct. at 1714. 
 
2. Another distinction, not raised by plaintiff and immaterial to the 
outcome of this case, is that in Lewis the injury was to a suspect while 
in this case it was to a bystander. In our pre-Lewis decision in Fagan v. 
City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994), we applied the shocks-the- 
conscience standard to the S 1983 claims of bystanders, without 
discussion. We agree with the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Onossian v. 
Block, 175 F.3d 1169, ____ (1999), that under Lewis "if a police officer 
is justified in giving chase, that justification insulates the officer 
from 
constitutional attack, irrespective of who might be harmed or killed as a 
consequence of the chase." See also Jones v. Sherill, 827 F.2d 1102, 
1106-7 (6th Cir. 1987) (similar standard applied to injured bystander). 
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(1) In Lewis, the police pursued two boys on a motorcycle 
which the officers observed operating at high speed. See 
118 S.Ct. at 1712. Neither boy had anything to do with the 
fight that had prompted the call that brought the officers to 
the scene. See id. In this case, the officers' suspicions were 
raised by Cook's unusually long stop at the intersection 
and rear-end damage to the car. Nothing in Lewis suggests 
that courts are free to second-guess a police officer's 
decision to initiate pursuit of a suspect so long as the 
officers were acting "in the service of a legitimate 
governmental objective," id. at 1716, here, to apprehend 
one fleeing the police officers' legitimate investigation of 
suspicious behavior. Because such circumstances, 
requiring a balancing of the need to stop a suspect's flight 
from the law against the threat a high-speed chase poses to 
others, "demand an officer's instant judgment, even 
precipitate recklessness fails to [suffice for Due Process 
liability.]" Id. at 1720. The critical factor in determining 
whether Fourteenth Amendment liability for a high-speed 
chase may be imposed is whether the officer's conduct can 
be found to shock the conscience, for which the evidence 
must show intent to harm the suspect physically. See id. 
 
(2) In Lewis, the court of appeals had reversed summary 
judgment for the defendant officer, finding a triable issue of 
fact because he had "apparently disregarded the 
Sacramento County Sheriff's Department's General Order 
on police pursuits." Id. at 1712. The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that "high-speed chases with no intent to 
harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight do 
not give rise to liability under the Fourteenth Amendment," 
and that "[t]he fault claimed on [the officer's] part . . . fails 
to meet the shocks-the-conscience test." Id. at 1720. Lewis 
thus squarely refutes plaintiff's contention that the officers' 
violation of police department regulations, which might 
be probative of recklessness or conscious disregard of 
plaintiff's safety, suffices to meet the shocks-the- 
conscience test under the due process clause. 
 
(3) In Lewis, the chase ended when the pursued 
motorcycle tipped over, throwing Lewis to the pavement 
where the police car coming to a stop accidentally skidded 
into him causing his injury. Here, the chase ended when 
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the pursuing police car bumped into the rear of Cook's car, 
causing him to lose control of the car, which led to the 
collision in which plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff argues that 
the deliberate ramming of Cook's car by the police vehicle 
amounted to use of a deadly weapon, which permits the 
drawing of an inference that the police acted with the intent 
to cause physical injury. We disagree. Lewis does not 
permit an inference of intent to harm simply because a 
chase eventuates in deliberate physical contact causing 
injury. Rather, it is "conduct intended to injure in some 
way unjustifiable by any government interest [that] is the 
sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience- 
shocking level." Id. at 1718 (emphasis added). It is not 
disputed that the ramming occurred in the course of the 
chase. That physical contact of some sort between the 
pursued and pursuing vehicles might occur in the course of 
a high-speed chase, particularly at its conclusion, is 
foreseeable. It would undermine Lewis' premise to limit 
liability to conscience-shocking conduct if courts were to 
segment a high-speed chase and examine elements in 
isolation from each other. 
 
Here then, as in Lewis, the officers were faced with 
lawless behavior--the flight from their investigation--for 
which they were not to blame. They had done nothing to 
cause Cook's high-speed driving or his flouting of their law- 
enforcement authority. Cook's action was instantaneous 
and so, by necessity, was the officers' response. Their intent 
was to do their job as law enforcement officers, not to cause 
injury. If they acted recklessly or imprudently, there is no 
evidence that their actions "were tainted by an improper or 
malicious motive." Id. at 1721. Because their actions did 
not shock the conscience, they were entitled to summary 
judgment. 
 
II. 42 U.S.C. S 1985 CLAIM 
 
Plaintiff also alleges that two of the individual police 
officers who chased Cook violated 42 U.S.C. S 1985 (1994) 
by filing false or misleading statements to investigators 
about their conduct on the night of the accident in an 
attempt to hide their culpable conduct. The only provision 
of S 1985 that could be relevant to plaintiff 's allegation is 
the second part of S 1985(2), which prohibits conspiracy to 
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obstruct justice with the intent to deny equal protection of 
the laws. Because plaintiff does not allege that the officers 
colluded with the requisite " `racial, or .. . otherwise class- 
based, invidiously discriminatory animus,' " see Kush v. 
Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 725 (1983) (quoting Griffin v. 
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)), the district court 
correctly dismissed this claim. 
 
III. STATE LAW NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS 
 
Having dismissed all of plaintiff 's federal claims, the 
district court dismissed without prejudice the state law 
claims against the owners of the civilian cars involved in 
the accident pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367(c). The district 
court had discretion to do so and we find no error. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The judgment is AFFIRMED. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I agree that the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment to the defendants should be affirmed. I write 
separately, however, to amplify my understanding of what 
we hold today, because I am concerned that our decision 
may be interpreted too broadly, and thereby result in an 
unjustified extension of County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 118 
S.Ct. 1708 (1998). 
 
The mere fact that force may have been used while 
effectuating an arrest does not automatically establish that 
the force was "in relation" to a legitimate object of the arrest 
under a S 1983 analysis. Davis must lose here, not because 
the challenged force occurred "in relation to" a high-speed 
chase, but because his allegations of a substantive due 
process violation are rooted in negligence and allege, at 
most, a reckless disregard of safety. That is clearly 
insufficient under Lewis. However, I believe the evidence 
here, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could 
support allegations of an intentional ramming of the Acura 
Cook was driving. Had Davis alleged such intentional 
conduct, I do not think his suit would be appropriate for 
summary judgment under Lewis. 
 
I. 
 
Paragraph 13 of the Complaint states: "plaintiff . . . 
alleges that the police vehicle either struck the 1993 Acura 
. . . or chased such vehicle at such a high rate of speed so 
as to cause the (stolen) vehicle to collide with other 
vehicles, setting off a chain reaction . . . ." Paragraph 14 
alleges that the pursuing officers were: "grossly negligent 
and [acted] with reckless and willful disregard for the safety 
of others . . . " in commencing and continuing the chase. 
Paragraph 18 alleges that the pursuing officers"either 
operated their vehicles in a negligent fashion, or permitted 
their vehicles to be operated in a negligent fashion such 
negligence being a contributing factor in the . . . collision. 
. . ." (emphasis added). Paragraph 21 alleges "the police 
chase . . . was knowingly improper and with wilful and/or 
reckless disregard for public safety and /or against 
established police guidelines and was engaged in with 
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wanton, wilful and reckless disregard for the safety of Davis 
and other persons and continued in such a manner as to 
shock the conscience of any reasonable person." 
 
As the majority correctly points out, Lewis requires more. 
There, the Supreme Court held that absent "an intent to 
harm suspects physically or to worsen their legal plight" 
there could be no liability for a substantive due process 
violation in the S 1983 context. Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1720. 
It is the intent to inflict force beyond that which is required 
by a legitimate law enforcement objective that "shocks the 
conscience" and gives rise to liability under S 1983 for 
injuries arising out of a high-speed chase. Id. at 1717 
("conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by 
any government interest is the sort of official action most 
likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level"). See also 
Maj. Op. at 6. Here, as in Lewis, the "complaint alleges a 
variety of culpable states of mind: negligently responsible 
. . . reckless, gross negligence and conscious disregard for 
[the plaintiff 's] safety . . . and oppression fraud and malice. 
The subsequent summary judgment proceedings revealed 
that the height of the fault actually claimed was conscious 
disregard . . ." Id. at 1720. That is simply not sufficient. 
 
In Lewis the Court was careful to note that the pursuing 
officers may have acted imprudently, even recklessly, but 
that the evidence did not support a conclusion that they 
intended to "terrorize, cause harm, or kill" the decedent. Id. 
at 1708. In fact, there the uncontradicted evidence was that 
the police car skidded over 140 feet trying to stop once the 
police saw that the fleeing motorcycle had crashed. That is, 
"the chase ended when the pursued motorcycle tipped over, 
throwing Lewis to the pavement where the police car 
coming to a stop accidentally skidded into him causing his 
injury." Maj. Op. at 5 (emphasis added). The fatal injuries 
sustained by Lewis were clearly a tragic, unintended result 
of the high-speed pursuit. There were no allegations that 
the police deliberately ran the decedent over or rammed the 
motorcycle. 
 
Here, if the record supported a finding that police 
gratuitously rammed Cook's car, and if plaintiff properly 
alleged that they did so to injure or terrorize Cook, liability 
could still attach under Lewis. Thus, for example, if 
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plaintiff alleged (and a fact finder could reasonably 
conclude) that the officers rammed Cook to "teach him a 
lesson" or to "get even" for subjecting them to the dangers 
of such a chase, Lewis would not shield the officers from 
liability even though they were ultimately effectuating an 
arrest. However, the District Court held that under Lewis a 
plaintiff must also provide evidence of a purpose to cause 
harm "independent of the process of stopping the suspect." 
Order at 9-10. I do not believe that is supported by Lewis. 
If police officers decided to stop a fleeing suspect by 
inflicting spinal cord injury in the hopes that the suspect 
would never walk again, the application of such force would 
not be truly "independent of the process of stopping the 
suspect." Nevertheless, their intent to harm, injure or 
terrorize the suspect might well shock the conscience and 
subject them to liability under Lewis. Thus, I do not read 
the majority opinion as holding that police can use any 
amount of force during a high speed chase no matter how 
tenuously the force is related to the legitimate law 
enforcement objective of arresting the fleeing suspect. 
 
It has long been established that law enforcement 
officials may not act in a manner that "shocks the 
conscience" even when their actions relate to the otherwise 
legitimate object of obtaining credible evidence or 
prosecuting criminal behavior. People of California v. 
Rochin, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (pumping suspect's 
stomach to obtain valuable, credible evidence of a drug 
crime violates due process). Neither the decision in Lewis, 
nor our decision here, creates a "high-speed-pursuit" 
exception to the fundamental obligation of law enforcement 
officials to respect "certain decencies of civilized conduct" 
even when carrying out their official duties. Lewis, 118 S. 
Ct. at 1717 (quoting Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173, with 
approval). The police in Rochin were liable because, even in 
the context of enforcing the law, "the Due Process Clause 
[is] intended to prevent government officials `from abusing 
their power, or employing it as an instrument of 
oppression.' " Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1716 (quoting Collins v. 
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992)). "[I]t was not the 
ultimate purpose of the government actors [in Rochin] to 
harm the plaintiff, but they apparently acted with full 
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appreciation of what the Court described as the brutality of 
their acts." Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1718 n.9. 
 
Lewis merely establishes that the environment in which 
law enforcement officers perform their duties informs the 
substantive due process analysis. 
 
       [W]hen unforeseen circumstances demand an officer's 
       instant judgment, even precipitate recklessness fails to 
       inch close enough to harmful purpose to spark the 
       shock that implicates `the large concerns of the 
       governors and the governed.' 
 
Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1720. Accordingly, "high-speed chases 
with no intent to harm suspects physically or to worsen 
their legal plight do not give rise to liability under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, redressible by an action under 
S 1983." Id. If there is "reasonable justification [for their 
actions] in the service of a legitimate governmental 
objective," they are not liable under Lewis even though they 
acted in a manner that was negligent or even reckless. 
Lewis, 118 S. Ct. at 1716. In Lewis the Court stated: 
 
       [W]hile prudence would have repressed [the officer's] 
       reaction, the officer's instinct was to do his job as a law 
       enforcement officer, not to induce [the motorcycle 
       driver's] lawlessness, or to terrorize, cause harm or kill. 
       Prudence, that is, was subject to countervailing 
       enforcement considerations . . . there is no reason to 
       believe that [the police] were tainted by an improper or 
       malicious motive. . .3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Similarly, in Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994), 
we held that "where a police officer uses a police vehicle to terrorize a 
civilian, and he has done so with malicious abuse of official power 
shocking the conscience, a court may conclude that the officers have 
crossed the constitutional line." 22 F.3d at 1308. In Fagan, a police 
officer attempted to stop and issue a warning to the driver of a Camaro 
when he saw a passenger standing up through the vehicle's open T-top 
roof. When the driver refused to stop, the officer commenced a high- 
speed pursuit through a residential neighborhood. The Camaro 
eventually ran a red light at an intersection and broad-sided a pick-up 
truck. The two occupants of the truck and one of the passengers in the 
Camaro were killed; two other passengers in the Camaro suffered 
crippling injuries. Because the officer's actions were reckless, but not 
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Id. at 1721. 
 
By way of example, I do not think that under Lewis police 
would be justified in firing shots directly at the driver of a 
fleeing car after initiating pursuit for a minor traffic 
violation, knowing that the fleeing car was about to reach 
a dead-end or some barricade that would force the driver to 
stop. I believe Lewis would allow a reasonable fact finder to 
conclude, based on the circumstances, that the action of 
the apprehending officers was intended to injure or 
terrorize the driver, thus permitting a determination that 
the driver's substantive due process rights had been 
violated. Such an intent to harm may be understandable 
given the dangers of law enforcement, but it also would be 
intolerable and absolutely collateral to any legitimate law 
enforcement objective. 
 
II. 
 
The majority states: "Lewis does not permit an inference 
of intent to harm simply because a chase eventuates in 
deliberate physical contact causing injury." Maj. Op. at 6. 
I must respectfully disagree with the breadth of that 
statement. I think the validity and the strength of any such 
inference depends entirely upon the totality of 
circumstances surrounding the contact, including the 
severity of the contact. The Supreme Court was careful to 
except from its holding cases where there was an intent to 
harm, terrorize or kill. I believe that there may well be those 
rare situations where the nature of an officer's"deliberate 
physical contact" is such that a reasonable factfinder 
would conclude the officer intended to harm, terrorize or 
kill. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
"arbitrary, intentional, [or] deliberate," we affirmed the trial court's 
grant 
of summary judgment in favor of the government. Although Fagan was 
decided prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis, we similarly held 
that "where a person suffers injury as an incidental and unintended 
consequence of official action, the abuse of power contemplated in the 
due process and eighth amendment cases does not arise." Id. at 1307 
(emphasis added). 
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There often is no way to establish subjective intent, other 
than by the reasonable fact finder's common sense 
evaluation of the circumstances. See Rock v. Zimmerman, 
1991 WL 148490, *8 (3d Cir. (Pa.)) (inferring intent from 
circumstances is "entirely appropriate and is often the only 
means of proving criminal intent"). Lewis establishes as a 
matter of law that the circumstances of the chase at issue 
there were insufficient to establish the required intent. It 
did not abrogate the rules of deductive reasoning and 
common sense that juries use every day. Indeed, intent, 
particularly in constitutional cases, often must be inferred 
from circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Village of Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 
265-68 (1977) (determination of discriminatory motive 
requires inquiry into circumstantial evidence); Oregon v. 
Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675 (1982) (intent of prosecutor to 
subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy 
Clause may be inferred from objective facts and 
circumstances); Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 693-98 (1993) (relying on 
circumstantial evidence to find high level officials liable for 
civil rights violations and recognizing that inS 1983 cases 
circumstantial evidence "is often the best and most reliable 
proof of the subjective motivations for the conduct of the 
actors"). 
 
Moreover, although I agree that the alleged violation of 
police regulations here does not advance the plaintiff 's 
claim, see Maj. Op. at 5, I think that the violation of such 
regulations will sometimes be relevant. For example, here, 
plaintiff submitted evidence that the officers did not comply 
with police department guidelines and regulations for 
initiating and conducting high-speed pursuits. One of those 
guidelines characterizes such conduct as use of "deadly 
force" akin to firing a weapon and states that officers 
should engage in such contact only "as a last resort to 
prevent eminent death or serious injuries." I believe a jury 
should be able to consider the alleged violations of 
department regulations, along with evidence contradicting 
the officers' account of what happened, to the extent they 
are relevant to the officers' intent. Defendants here have 
completely denied any police involvement in the accident 
which resulted in Davis' injuries. The police claim that they 
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broke off the pursuit blocks before the accident because 
their overhead lights had malfunctioned. However, there is 
strong evidence to the contrary. There is evidence that, 
although the overhead lights did have problems in the past, 
they had been repaired 24 hours before the accident. 
Moreover, departmental regulations require officers to 
check their patrol cars for equipment problems before going 
on patrol. The car that collided with Cook was used on the 
very next shift, and there is no evidence that the patrol car 
was taken for any repairs to its overhead lights following 
the accident. Finally, eye-witness accounts directly 
contradict the officers' denials of involvement. Richard Hall, 
a disinterested bystander, submitted a sworn affidavit 
stating that the police car did "bump" or "hit" the Acura, 
possibly twice, before the Acura went out of control. 
Dwayne Cook, the driver of the Acura, also testified that he 
felt a "jerk," which was caused by the police car bumping 
him. He further testified that the impact caused him to hit 
his head on the steering wheel and pass out. 
 
As noted previously, none of this is relevant here because 
plaintiff alleges, at most, that the police acted recklessly. 
However, I believe such violations and conflicts in 
testimony would be relevant in an appropriate case as 
probative of a defendant's intent. 
 
III. 
 
In conclusion, I concur in the judgment of the majority. 
However, as I mentioned at the outset, I write separately 
because I think there are subtle, and perhaps misleading, 
nuances arising from the decision in Lewis which merit 
further discussion. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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